证监会更新加密资产问答：参与治理投票的代币持有人一般不构成「中心方」
美国证券交易委员会（SEC）公司金融司11月2日更新其加密资产常见问题文件，新增第1.4、1.5、1.6三条问答，专门说明代币持有人参与治理时，如何判断一个加密系统是否存在握有控制权的「中心方」。该问答文件最初于今年9月25日发布，本次三条新增问答均标注为11月2日加入。
第1.4条说，判断治理参与者是否构成「中心方」定义下的「一群人或实体」，要看具体事实。参与功能性系统广泛治理的持有人，如果彼此没有关联关系，也没有在参与治理本身之外另行达成协同行事的协议、安排或默契（包括通过委托投票的方式），一般不会被视为一个团体。治理通过组织、协会或基金会进行、参与资格基于持有该系统原生代币时，结论相同。即使参与者在某些情形下被认定为一个团体，也仍须实际握有对系统的运营、经济或投票控制，才构成「中心方」。
工作人员对「广泛治理」的界定是：透明、以规则为基础，允许广泛而多元、而非集中于少数人的一群利益相关者提出并表决代码、协议、经济模型或治理框架的修改，或选举、罢免代表；这群人行使权利无需中心方批准，中心方也不得拥有不成比例的影响力或过大的投票权。
第1.5条界定了「监督参与」：中心方在协议层、验证者层或用户层任一层级握有控制准入的权力，即构成对参与的监督，包括单方面准予或限制准入、决定或修改软件升级、协议变更或原生代币分发的投票程序、控制谁能参加共识机制验证交易，以及修改系统规则代码、撤销交易或吊销准入。反过来，系统运行的各个重要环节都由规则代码自动执行、无人拥有裁量权时，或裁量只通过广泛治理行使时，一般不算有中心方在监督参与。
第1.6条区分两个易混概念：「功能性」讲的是效用，即原生代币能按系统设定的程序化用途在系统内使用；「去中心化」讲的是自治，即系统自主运行、没有任何人、实体或团体握有运营、经济或投票控制。功能性系统带有去中心化的特征，但去中心化程度依具体事实而定，两者不能画等号。
这批问答承接证监会今年3月17日的解释性发布。那份发布与商品期货交易委员会（CFTC）联署，把加密资产分为数字商品、数字收藏品、数字工具、支付型稳定币与数字证券五类，其中数字商品本身不是证券；本次新增问答所阐明的，正是数字商品一类中「中心方」概念的适用边界。
证监会在问答页首声明：这些回答仅代表公司金融司工作人员的观点，不是证监会的规则、法规或声明，委员会未曾批准也未否决其内容；与所有工作人员指引一样，它们没有法律效力，不改变现行法律，也不为任何人创设新的义务。a16z加密业务首席法务官 Miles Jennings 公开评论称，这次更新是对代币分类框架「有帮助的澄清」，并特别提到治理可以借助怀俄明州去中心化非法人非营利协会（DUNA）一类法律实体进行、而不因此失去去中心化属性。
（来源：美国证券交易委员会）
SEC Updates Crypto FAQ: Token Holders Voting in Governance Generally Not a 'Central Party'
The Division of Corporation Finance of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on November 2 updated its crypto asset frequently asked questions, adding Questions 1.4, 1.5 and 1.6 on how to tell whether a crypto system has a controlling 'central party' when token holders take part in governance. The FAQ document was first issued on September 25, and each of the three new answers is marked as added on November 2.
Question 1.4 says whether governance participants amount to a 'group of persons or entities' under the central-party definition is a facts-and-circumstances question. Participants in a functional system's broad-based governance generally will not be considered a group if they are not affiliated and have no agreement, arrangement or understanding, formal or informal, including through delegation, to act in concert apart from their participation in the governance system itself. The same applies where governance runs through an organization, association or foundation and participation is based on holding the system's native crypto asset. Even if participants were treated as a group in some circumstances, they would still need to hold operational, economic or voting control of the system to be a central party.
The staff describe broad-based governance as transparent and rules-based, allowing a wide and diverse group of stakeholders, not concentrated in a small set of persons, to propose and vote on changes to the code, protocol, economic model or governance framework, or to elect and remove representatives, without central-party approval and without a central party holding disproportionate influence or outsized voting power.
Question 1.5 defines 'oversight of participation': a central party oversees participation when it has authority to control access to the system at the protocol, validator or user level, including unilaterally granting or limiting access, determining or changing voting processes for software upgrades, protocol changes or distributions of the native asset, controlling who can take part in the consensus mechanism, and modifying the system's rules-based code, reversing transactions or revoking access. Conversely, there is generally no central-party oversight where every material aspect of operation runs automatically under rules-based code with no discretion, or where discretion is exercised solely through broad-based governance whose participants are not a central party.
Question 1.6 separates two easily confused concepts. 'Functional' is about utility: the native asset can be used on the system in accordance with its programmatic utility. 'Decentralized' is about autonomy: the system operates on its own, with no person, entity or group holding operational, economic or voting control. A functional system has characteristics of decentralization, but the degree varies with the facts, and the two terms are not interchangeable.
The new answers build on the Commission's March 17 interpretive release, issued jointly with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), which sorted crypto assets into five categories - digital commodities, digital collectibles, digital tools, payment stablecoins and digital securities - with digital commodities not themselves securities. The new questions clarify the boundary of the 'central party' concept within the digital-commodity discussion.
The SEC states at the top of the FAQ page that the answers represent the views of the Division of Corporation Finance staff only; they are not a rule, regulation or statement of the Commission, which has neither approved nor disapproved them, and like all staff guidance they have no legal force, do not change existing law and create no new obligations for any person. Miles Jennings, chief legal officer of a16z crypto, said publicly that the update was a helpful clarification of the token taxonomy and noted that governance can make use of legal entities such as a Wyoming DUNA while maintaining decentralized governance.
(Source: U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission)
来源：美国证券交易委员会
发布：GSM·美国（发布链接）
图片来源：图：美国证券交易委员会总部大楼（固定图库）。AgnosticPreachersKid 摄，CC BY-SA 3.0，经 Wikimedia Commons。 / Photo: U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission headquarters (file photo). By AgnosticPreachersKid, CC BY-SA 3.0, via Wikimedia Commons.
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